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Rebels, Revenue, and Redistribution:
The Political Geography of Post-Conflict
Power-Sharing in Africa∗
Felix Haass† Martin Ottmann‡
Abstract
Do rebel elites who gain access to political power through power-sharing reward
their own ethnic constituencies after war? We argue that power-sharing governments
serve as instruments for rebel elites to access state resources. This access allows
elites to allocate state resources disproportionately to their regional power bases,
particularly the settlement areas of rebel groups’ ethnic constituencies. To test this
proposition, we link information on rebel groups in power-sharing governments in
African post-conflict countries to information about ethnic support for rebel orga-
nizations. We combine this information with sub-national data on ethnic groups’
settlement areas and data on night light emissions to proxy sub-national variation in
resource investments. Implementing a difference-in-differences empirical strategy,
we show that regions with ethnic groups represented through rebels in the power-
sharing government exhibit higher levels of night light emissions than those regions
without such representation. Our findings help to reconceptualize post-conflict
power-sharing arrangements as rent-generating and redistributive institutions.
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Introduction
Distributional conflict lies at the heart of many contemporary civil wars. In negoti-
ated settlements to civil wars, government and rebels therefore sometimes resort to
wealth-sharing arrangements, natural resource management institutions, or territorial
decentralization to resolve disagreements over redistributive politics (Bakke 2015; Bin-
ningsbo and Rustad 2012). Often, however, these mechanisms are not part of a peace
agreement to begin with, or are only implemented years after the fighting has stopped
(Ottmann and Vüllers 2015). Instead, power-sharing governments—typically transitional
cabinets in which both rebel and government elites hold minister portfolios—are the
most common provision in peace agreements (see Figure 1).
The literature offers different explanations how such executive power-sharing institu-
tions solve the distributional problem of civil conflicts. Some argue that power-sharing
governments solve a commitment problem between former battlefield opponents by
providing access to decision-making power (Gates et al. 2016; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003;
Walter 2002). Others point to the redistributive potential of post-conflict power-sharing,
specifically at the elite and ethnic group level (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013;
Dal Bó and Powell 2009; Lijphart 1977). But whether power-sharing governments actu-
ally realize this redistributive potential has not sufficiently been investigated. Do rebel
elites who gain access to political power through power-sharing reward their own ethnic
constituencies after war?
We build on theories about ethnic redistribution in non-conflict contexts and rent
allocation in state-building to answer this question (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000;
Ejdemyr, Kramon, and Robinson 2018; Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015; North, Wallis,
and Weingast 2009; Tajima, Samphantharak, and Ostwald 2018). We theorize that in
a power-sharing cabinet, rebel elites—and with them their ethnic constituents—gain
access to state resources through direct cabinet-level government participation. Modeling
rebel and government elites as rent- and office-seeking agents implies that both sides
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Figure 1. Practices of Post-Conflict Power-Sharing Types Across World Regions
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Note: Own depiction based on information the Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) (Ottmann and Vüllers
2015).
steer resources to their constituencies as elites seek to secure political support from their
constituencies in exchange for preferential resource allocation (Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003). Such favoritism overlaps with the geography of ethnic settlements that fuels much
of the civil war violence between the political center and the periphery (Boone 2003;
De Luca et al. 2018; Herbst 2000). We therefore hypothesize that the redistributive effect
of power-sharing expresses itself in rebels’ preferential treatment of the sub-national
settlement areas of those ethnic groups on whose support rebels relied during the war.
Ultimately, this preferential treatment should be visible as more pronounced economic
development in the settlement areas of rebels’ ethnic support groups compared to groups
excluded from power-sharing, or groups that now have to share a piece of the economic
pie.
To test this prediction, we construct a dataset that captures patterns of sub-national
economic development in seven African post-conflict countries. Africa is the world region
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with the highest number of civil conflicts and, consequently, the most attempts to solve
these wars with negotiated settlements (Kreutz 2010). Our empirical focus on Africa
therefore ensures that we gather specific knowledge on how a large portion of today’s
civil wars are resolved. Moreover, from a research design perspective, focusing on Africa
allows us to implicitly control for important context factors, such as the political role
of ethnicity (Rosenbaum 2002), improving the internal validity of our findings (Samii
2016).
Our starting point is the Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) which provides us
with fine-grained data on the occurrence, type, and duration of rebel participation in
post-conflict power-sharing (Ottmann and Vüllers 2015). We combine this data with
information on the ethnic affiliations of rebel groups and the geographic location of
ethnic groups provided by the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) datasets (Vogt et al. 2015).
We measure our dependent variable—sub-national variation in economic development—
through satellite data on the night-time light intensity for each grid cell (Tollefsen, Strand,
and Buhaug 2012). Changes in night light emissions plausibly reflect differences in
resource investments and local economic development, especially in contexts where other
information sources about resource investments are scarce (Henderson, Storeygard, and
Weil 2012; Weidmann and Schutte 2017).
Our empirical strategy exploits the over time variation in night lights emissions in a
difference-in-differences approach: We statistically compare regions that are “treated”
with representation in the power-sharing government to those regions that do not become
represented in the executive before and after the implementation of the agreement. The
difference-in-differences strategy is particularly powerful since it allows us to control
for a number of important time-invariant confounders, such as baseline differences in
local economic development or ethnic heterogeneity. To rule out time-variant alternative
explanations for uneven post-conflict economic recovery we control for population and
conflict intensity and construct placebo tests for non-treated groups.
Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we find robust support that power-sharing
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increases night-time light intensity in those areas inhabited by ethnic groups linked to
rebel elites in power-sharing governments. In support of the postulated redistributive
mechanism, we show that this effect is more pronounced when rebel elites have better
access to resources, for instance by occupying cabinet portfolios that manage the country’s
economy, its resources, or infrastructure. Moreover, we find a stronger effect in those
grid cells occupied by the ethnic group from which the rebel leader originates, and a
weaker effect in ethnically heterogeneous regions—a pattern consistent with a strat-
egy of preferentially targeting politically important constituencies while simultaneously
disadvantaging regions where it is difficult to identify ethnic supporters.
This article makes two notable contributions. First, we propose a political economy
model of post-conflict power-sharing. So far, scholars have mainly focused on how
power-sharing governments provide guaranteed participation in the political decision-
making process (Gates et al. 2016; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Walter 2002). While
these studies emphasize the important role elites and their constituencies play for the
pacifying function of power-sharing, they largely disregard the potential redistributive
effects of power-sharing between elites and their constituencies. Other researchers have
made this redistributive potential of power-sharing more explicit, particularly when it
comes to horizontal inequalities among elites and ethnic groups in the capital (Cederman,
Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Dal Bó and Powell 2009; Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015;
Lijphart 1977).
Missing from both strands of research, however, is a theory and evidence of how
power-sharing realizes this redistributive potential. In this article, we address this gap.
We break up the unitary, rebel group-level focus into rebel elites and their geographically
concentrated ethnic constituencies. Building on insights from the literature on ethnic
redistribution and rent allocation in state development, we identify this elite-ethnic
constituency relationship as a central axis along which post-conflict redistribution should
take place (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Bates 2008; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009).
This approach demonstrates empirically that the elite-constituency relationship in power-
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sharing institutions has not only a security dimension (Gates et al. 2016), but also an
important economic one. Moreover, it clarifies how power-sharing shapes distributional
politics in the context of ethnically divided societies to address horizontal inequalities
(Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013).
Second, our study adds to the literature on redistributive politics and ethnic favoritism.
Research on rebels’ civilian wartime constituencies (Kalyvas 2006) implicitly suggests
that elite-constituency relationships should also shape redistributive politics after conflict.
Yet, the literature on distributive politics in the developing world lacks an explicit theo-
retical and empirical focus on post-conflict settings, particularly on the disaggregated
geographical level (Golden and Min 2013). In contrast, and in line with existing research
from non-conflict contexts, we show that ethnic favoritism in post-conflict contexts is
particularly prevalent in ethnically homogeneous regions. We therefore add to the finding
that ethnic segregation can improve partial public goods provision (Ejdemyr, Kramon,
and Robinson 2018; Tajima, Samphantharak, and Ostwald 2018) evidence from a context
where ethnic segregation is particularly salient: in the aftermath of civil war.
The Political Geography of Power-Sharing
We build our political economy theory on the definition of power-sharing as institutions
that allocate “[. . . ] decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among
collectivities competing for power” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 320). Scholars typically
distinguish between different variants of power-sharing institutions that address distinct
political questions. Political power-sharing arrangements regulate access and distribution
of power through granting rebels minister positions or parliamentary quotas. Territorial
arrangements regulate questions of regional autonomy. Military arrangements integrate
insurgent and national armies. Finally, economic arrangements resolve questions of
resource redistribution (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003).
We challenge this conceptual distinction and the implicit assumption that power-
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sharing has economic and geographic implications only in explicit economic and territorial
arrangements. Instead, political power-sharing, most notably in the form of power-sharing
governments at the political center of a country, has an economic and regional dimension,
too. This regional dimension results from limited territorial authority in remote areas
and the economic value of political office.
Securing Wealth from Power
In his analysis of African states, Herbst (2000, 151) explains that the “physical control
of the capital cannot be equated with control of these countries.” Yet it is the capital
where significant resource flows in the form of aid, tax and natural resource income as
well as international legitimacy reside. Wherever elites face such situations of limited
territorial control, the state at the center must negotiate with rural elites over institutional
arrangements that satisfy both the central government’s and rural elites’ interests (Boone
2003). Power-sharing governments represent the outcome of such negotiations over
territorial authority in an extreme case: in the aftermath of violent rebellion.
In addition to representing territorial arrangements between central and peripheral
elites, power-sharing governments also secure “wealth from power” for participating
elites (Bates 2008, 43). Rebel organizations’ admission to the power-sharing government
gives them a unique opportunity to access state revenues—access the rebel side did
not have during the war. As this temporal variation in the access to state resources for
rebel groups is absent for the government side in a power-sharing government, we focus
predominantly on redistribution by rebel elites in power-sharing executives.1
Power-sharing governments institutionalize access to state resources for rebel elites
through the distribution of minister positions in the post-conflict cabinet. Obviously,
executive power-sharing is not the only way to access state resources. Rebel elites can
1Cabinet reshuffles also occur on the government side in power-sharing cabinets. But even though the
peace process might alter the individual elites in the eventual power-sharing government, the government
side’s ethnic support groups typically do not vary in their access to state resources through their government
representatives.
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also gain this access through high-ranking military positions or guaranteed shares of
parliament seats. In the large majority of post-conflict countries, however, it is the
executive where political power, and thus a pathway to patronage resources, is located
(Rainer and Trebbi 2016). This is particularly true in the African context, where “ministers
not only have a hand in deciding where to allocate public resources, presumably in their
home districts, but are also in positions to supplement their personal incomes by offering
contracts and jobs in exchange for other favors” (Arriola 2009, 1346).2
We assume that these rebel elites do not differ from other rent-seeking elites in power:
they require rents in order to address the political, economic and social inequalities
which motivated their armed struggle against the central government in the first place
(Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). Political office gained through power-sharing
provides them with the financial means to do so (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Rebels
can strategically redistribute these resources to their constituencies in exchange for
political support. Such preferential resource allocation can take different forms. It can
include targeting funds from tax revenue, natural resources, and foreign aid through
patronage networks to former rebels’ own constituencies. Redistribution can also take
the form of preferential access to post-conflict reconstruction aid by recipient rebel
constituencies.3 While the precise form of this targeted investment is likely context-
specific, preferential redistribution should ultimately manifest itself in uneven patterns
of sub-national economic development (Hodler and Raschky 2014; Kramon and Posner
2013).
The political pressure to redistribute resources is intensified by the temporal limitation
of power-sharing governments. Executive power-sharing—as opposed to most other
forms of post-conflict institutional arrangements—is often temporally limited as interim
governments are replaced by elected governments after a pre-agreed period. Rebels
in such temporally limited power-sharing cabinets cannot be certain that they will be
2Accessing state resources through government ministries is not limited to the most powerful cabinet
posts. Kramon and Posner (2016, 4), for instance, report that a co-ethnic as minister of education has “an
effect roughly comparable to having a co-ethnic president” on citizens’ additional years of education.
3See Jablonski (2014) on the political role of aid in non-conflict contexts.
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represented in the post-interim government, after elections have taken place. The limited
time horizon of executive power-sharing adds to elites’ incentives to capture as many
resources in the present and channel them towards their constituencies to secure political
survival in the future (Levi 1989).
Distributing Wealth to the Periphery
The key recipient of rebel elites’ redistributive strategy are the ethnic support networks
established during the course of the civil war. In a large majority of civil wars—and
especially so on the African continent—these support networks are built on ethnic groups.
The dense social networks of ethnic groups ensure a low-cost access to information about
the group members’ behavior and preferences (Fearon and Laitin 1996). This information
increases trust within the ethnic group and lowers coordination costs of organizing
rebellion. Rebel elites therefore buy support from co-ethnics because it is “cheaper” than
buying it from any other social group. Finally, ideas of within-group solidarity, a shared
fate of marginalization through an out-group, as well as shared feelings of territoriality
and ethnic “homelands” provide powerful narratives of identity and, thus, a basis for
political mobilization, particularly through ethnic parties (Utas 2012).
Geographically, rebel elites’ ethnic favoritism manifests itself in regional favoritism
(Hodler and Raschky 2014). This pattern is a function of the territorial dimension of
executive power-sharing at the political center hypothesized above: Ethnic identity in
Africa is heavily linked to the spatial location of a group within a state (Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou 2013). This spatial concentration of ethnic settlements overlaps with
weak territorial authority over many of these settlement areas as a result of weak states
in Africa (Herbst 2000). Even if elites engage in rent capture directly in the capital, it
is this overlap between ethnic settlement and political as well as geographical distance
to the center that makes it likely that ethnic favoritism translates into regional resource
investment along ethnic lines (De Luca et al. 2018). Accordingly, preferential resource
allocation is likely to cluster in the settlement area of a rebel groups’ ethnic constituency.
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Thus, our main observable implication is:
Hypothesis 1: Sub-national regions with ethnic constituencies of rebel groups will display
higher levels of post-conflict development once rebel elites participate in a power-sharing
government, compared to regions without rebel representation in the same period.
Data
To test our argument empirically, we construct a dataset of African countries between
1992 and 2005 in which a civil war had been concluded with a peace agreement and in
which the conflict parties implemented executive power-sharing at the national level of
government.4 We explicitly focus on countries where the civil war did not recur within
the first five post-conflict years. This ensures that our estimates of resource allocation
after the power-sharing government are not distorted by the recurrence of large-scale
violence. Moreover, the power-sharing government itself needs to have lasted at least
one year. The one-year duration criterion ensures that a meaningful amount of resource
allocation can take place. For all countries that conform to these criteria (see Table 1), we
include in our sample three years before the year in which the power-sharing government
is implemented and three years after. This allows us to exploit temporal variation in
resource investments within these countries.
Our primary unit of observation is the grid cell within these countries. Building on
the spatial disaggregation by the PRIO-GRID data set, we use 0.5 x 0.5 decimal degree
resolution cells, i.e. the grid cells are approximately 55 x 55 km in size at the equator
(Tollefsen, Strand, and Buhaug 2012). We choose grid cells as a unit of observation over
other possible sub-national units of observation—such as second-level administrative
units—because grid cells allow us to use very fine-grained disaggregated data. Given the
4We employ the UCDP definitions of ‘civil war’ and ‘peace agreement’ (Gleditsch et al. 2002). The
temporal domain is restricted to 1992-2005 as data on night-time light intensity only goes back to 1992 and
PSED only covers peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2006. We exclude the peace agreements in
Burundi (2000 and 2003) and Djibouti (1994 and 2000) where no geographically distinct ethnic settlement
patterns are observable. We also exclude the 2000 peace agreement in the Comoros as it is missing from
the EPR data.
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Table 1. Countries and Grid Cells in the Sample
Country First Year of
Power-
Sharing
Years in
Time-Series
No. of
grid-cells in
country
No. of
grid-cells
years in Time
Series
Rebels in
Power-
Sharing
Angola 2003 2000-2006 435 3045 UNITA
DRC 2004 2001-2007 763 5341 MLC, RCD
Ivory Coast 2006 2003-2009 113 791 FN
Liberia 2004 2001-2007 37 259 LURD, MODEL
Mali 1994 1992-1997 426 2556 MPA
Niger 1999 1996-2002 402 2814 ORA/CRA
Sudan 2006 2003-2009 840 5880 SPLM/A, NDA
Notes: Only five years are included for Mali, since we lack data on night lights emissions prior to 1992.
high spatial resolution of the PRIO-GRID we can precisely distinguish between urbanized
and other areas, for instance. This distinction also allows us to test theoretical implications
about development patterns within ethnic settlement groups and to exploit the contiguity
of cells in robustness checks.
Most importantly, grid cells are drawn artificially. This ensures that they are strictly
exogenous to the phenomenon of our study. The borders of second-level administrative
units or the spatial extent of ethnic settlement areas, in contrast, are historically grown,
reflecting unobserved historical features, including conflict history.5 Thus alternative
units of analysis run into danger of being endogenous to the conflict process itself.6
Night-Time Light Intensity
We argue that the redistributive effect of power-sharing manifests itself in more pro-
nounced levels of sub-national economic development in rebels’ ethnic constituency areas.
We proxy the average development level of a grid cell/year with the intensity of night
lights in a given grid cell/year. Night-time light intensity is captured by satellites from
5In their presentation of the GeoEPR data, Wucherpfennig et al. (2011, 431) discuss how their mea-
surement reflects changing settlement areas inter alia due to conflict processes.
6Nevertheless, our choice of unit of observation could induce a modifiable area unit problem. In the
appendix, we therefore present replications of our analysis on a sample of administrative units and ethnic
settlement areas as units of observation.
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the United States Air Force and Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) with
an Operational Linescan System (OLS). The DMSP-OLS data covers the entire globe,
dates back to 1992, and is provided in digital format by the US National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The NOAA image processing removes sources other
than artificial illumination, such as forest fires or strong moon light. The processed
satellite data is combined over an entire year for a land area which approximates 0.86 x
0.86 km at the equator. The PRIO-GRID dataset aggregates these pixel values to a 55 x
55 km grid. It adjusts the original DMPS-OLS night lights pixel intensity for changes in
lens sensitivity over time, thereby normalizing the 0 to 63 original scale of light intensity
to a value between 0 and 1 (Tollefsen, Strand, and Buhaug 2012).
Satellite imagery of night light emissions has been used in a variety of studies to
capture sub-national variation in development and has been reported to correlate highly
with sub-national levels of GDP (Min 2015; Weidmann and Schutte 2017). One advan-
tage of using night lights as proxy for resource allocation is that it is independent of
political interference and imprecise measurement through national statistical offices.
Prior research has also shown that satellite imagery of night light emissions is uniquely
suited to detect electrification, even in areas that are characterized by very low levels of
overall electrification such as rural Africa (Min et al. 2013).
As electricity is reflective of economic development more broadly, night lights capture
a wide range of economic outcomes that can result from preferential political treatment
in post-conflict states (Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2012; Weidmann and Schutte
2017). The first outcome of resource redistribution captured by night lights is electricity
itself. In economies devastated by civil conflict, as in any state in the developing and
developed world, access to electricity “is a life-altering transformation that improves
welfare” (Min 2015, 2). Other investments reflected by night lights, however, likely
depend on the political economy of respective country contexts. In the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, for instance, diamond, gold, copper and coltan mining was a
substantial income source of rebel groups during the conflict. As a consequence, resource
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redistribution through power-sharing often took the form of preferential concessions
grants for resource exploitation in areas over which rebels still held control (Global
Witness 2006). In other contexts, differences in night lights might reflect differential
access to post-conflict reconstruction projects, which is often shaped by the politics of
(formerly) armed groups (Parks, Colletta, and Oppenheim 2013). Night lights serve as
useful proxy for the changes in economic productivity as a result of these different types
of political preferential treatment.
Power-Sharing Governments
Our theoretical argument rests on the assumption that rebel groups preferentially steer re-
sources to their ethnic constituency groups. We define a rebel group’s ethnic constituency
as those ethnic groups from which a rebel group has recruited, to which it made any
claim to fight on its behalf, or from which it received substantial political support during
the civil war (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012). Examples for such rebel constituencies include
the Dinka in Southern Sudan which formed the main support group for SPLA leader John
Garang (and his successor Salva Kiir Mayardit), the Mandingo and Krahn communities
supporting LURD and MODEL during the later stages of the Liberian civil war or the
Angolan Ovimbundu-Ovambo which backed UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi.
To empirically identify these rebel constituencies for the seven countries in our sample,
we combine data from the PSED with information on rebels’ ethnic affiliations and the
sub-national settlement patterns of ethnic groups from the EPR project (Ottmann and
Vüllers 2015; Vogt et al. 2015). In a first step, we use PSED to identify when a particular
rebel group gained access to ministry positions in a joint power-sharing government
following a civil war. PSED also provides information on the overall number of portfolios
hold by these rebel elites in the power-sharing government and the exact type of each
portfolio. In total, rebels held 59 distinct portfolios over time in the countries in our
sample. The number of portfolios in a single power-sharing government varies from a
minimum of 1 (Niger) to a maximum of 12 (Sudan).
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We then match the data on rebel groups in power-sharing arrangements to the list
of rebels’ ethnic affiliations provided by the ACD2EPR data collection (Wucherpfennig
et al. 2012). This link allows us to use data on the sub-national settlement patterns of
all ethnic groups to identify the geographic location of the constituencies supporting
the rebel elites in power-sharing governments (Vogt et al. 2015). There are 55 distinct
ethnic groups in our sample. Of these, 19 are represented by rebel groups participating
in power-sharing governments. 13 are linked to ethnic groups which are represented in
the government without being linked to a rebel group. 23 ethnic groups do not have any
representation on the national level through either government or rebel actors.
Combining PSED and EPR in this way enables us to create our main independent
variable Representation in Executive Power-Sharing. This dummy-coded variable measures
whether a grid cell is inhabited by one or more ethnic groups who have a link to a rebel
group that is represented in the power-sharing government.
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Figure 2. Rebel Constituencies and Night Lights
(a) Constituencies
Rebels' ethnic 
constituency area
No Yes
(b) Night lights
Night lights two years 
after start of power−sharing
No increase Increase
15
Descriptive Evidence
Figure 2 offers first descriptive evidence in line with our argument. The left panel plots the
geographical distribution of rebels’ and the government’s constituency groups according
to the settlement of their ethnic support groups. The right panel plots the presence of a
night light increase between the first full year in which the power-sharing government
was in place and two years later.
Figure 2 displays substantial variation and considerable geographic extent in the
settlement patterns of rebels’ ethnic support groups. In some cases the extent of these
constituency areas is driven by rebels’ links to numerous ethnic groups with locally
concentrated settlement regions, such as in Sudan. In other cases, e.g. with UNITA in
Angola, the geographic extent of rebel groups’ ethnic settlement patterns is a function
of one, relatively homogeneous group, in this case the Ovimbundu-Ovambo. We also
observe a visible overlap in night light increases and rebel constituency areas.
Zooming in on the sub-national level, we also find indicative evidence for our pos-
tulated redistributive mechanism. Consider the example of the Ivory Coast. In 2005,
after repeated attempts to pacify the conflict between the Force Nouvelles (FN) rebels
from the northern part of the country and the government in the south, the two sides
agreed to set up a wide-ranging power-sharing government. The FN rebels—an umbrella
group which subsumed a number of Ivorian rebel outfits—received a total of six minister
positions. One of these minister positions, the ministry of sports, was given to Michel
Gueu, a military commander in the MPCI rebel group which was part of the FN.
In 2008, with the FN still participating in the power-sharing government (even though
Gueu had become Army Inspector of the FN in the meantime), Gueu sketched the political
and economic agenda of the FN:
I take, for instance, the case of the region of Binhouye. You know that from
Zouan-Hounien to Bloléquin via Binhouye the route section is not asphalted
and I suppose that our executives, especially our elected representatives, will
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ask the President of the Republic to have this route section asphalted which
is estimated at 100 and 150 km at most. And when we know that the road
precedes development, I think this is also a boost that we will give to the
development of our different regions. (Louamy 2008, n.p.)
The quote illustrates that it is the FN’s participation at the level of the executive—the
power-sharing government—that enabled it to petition the president to steer development
resources to the region of Binhouye. Indeed, if we examine night light emissions in the
region of Binhouye before and during the power-sharing government, we see improve-
ments in night light emissions. The upper panel of Figure 3 plots Binhouye—which is
located in the constituency area of the FN rebels—and the surrounding cities. Between
2004 and 2008, the plot indicates a visible increase in light emissions in Binhouye itself
and the neighbouring city Zouan-Hounien.
Our data also indicate that the redistributive mechanism follows ethnic lines. Consider
the example of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where, during its 1998-2003 civil
war
[...] control of the DRC’s Equateur province was divided. Jean-Pierre Bemba’s
MLC held the northern part [...]. Bemba’s family towns, Gbadolite and
Gemena, became the rebel headquarters. [...] Kabila’s Kinshasa government
controlled the southern half of the province. It is no conincidence that
this Maginot line between north and south also largely mirrored the ethnic
divisions between Ngwaka and others in the north (Bemba’s ethnic parentage
[...]) and southern Equateur, which is largely ethnically Mongo.
[...] The fact that Bemba was seen as a [...] son of the land greatly advantaged
the [MLC] movement in the early years of the war. [...] During the war, as
soon as a town or village fell to the MLC, the rebel movement would set up a
local administrative structure consisting of an executive branch of the MLC, a
territorial council [...] and a territorial assembly. (Carayannis and Lombard
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Figure 3. Night Lights and Constituency Regions
Note: The plot compares night light emissions in rebel ethnic constituency areas in Ivory Coast and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. A darker red/yellow indicates higher night lights emissions. The
red/dark grid cell in the inset map indicates the location of the displayed areas in relation to the rest of the
countries. The shaded blue-filled areas in the inset map represent the rebels’ constituency areas.
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2015, 256-257)
This ethno-administrative governance structure during the war likely casts a shadow
into the structure of post-conflict preferential treatment. Indeed, if we examine the
satellite emissions of night lights in Gbadolite, the MLC’s headquarter and the Bemba’s
family town, we observe a visible increase in emissions between conflict and power-
sharing periods (see lower panel of Figure 3).
Econometric Strategy
Unobserved confounders might render these patterns based on descriptive evidence
spurious, however. We therefore turn to a multivariate analysis. The main problem with
simply comparing night lights in grid cells that are represented in the central power-
sharing coalition to those that are not, stems from the heterogeneity of these geographical
units. It is plausible to assume that any observed difference in light emission is (at least
in part) driven by, for instance, degree of urbanization, remoteness from the regional
capital and/or borders, population size, or level of destruction during the civil war. To
address this problem, we exploit the temporal structure of our data set. Specifically, we
estimate a model of the following form:
NLi t+1 = β1Representation in Executive Power-Sharingi t + β2Xi t + γi +ηt + εi t (1)
We expect β1 to be positive indicating that grid cells have higher night light emissions
when they become represented in executive power-sharing. Including grid cell fixed
effects—denoted by γi in Equation 1—allows us to only use over-time variation within a
given cell. γi strips the results from all potential, time-invariant unobserved confounders
on a grid cell level, such as geography or history. This enables us to statistically construct
a natural comparison group for each grid cell, namely the same cell at different points
in time, and trace the representation status of each grid cell over time. Importantly, γi
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also controls whether a group is inhabited by groups with ethnic links to the government
as opposed to the rebels, since, unlike rebel representation, this link does not vary over
time. Adding a full set of country-year dummies, ηt , controls for country- and time
specific shocks that are common to conflict-to-peace transitions, such as anticipatory
effects by rebels and governments prior to the implementation of a peace agreement,
peace dividends or aid spikes in years after a conflict has ended.7
Set up this way, Equation 1 represents a dynamic difference-in-differences design.
We compare before-after power-sharing variation in night lights (first difference) with
variation across represented and non-represented grid cells (second difference). Under
the assumption of common trends in night light emissions prior to the “treatment” of
power-sharing, the coefficient β1 in Equation 1 equals the average treatment effect of
Representation in Executive Power-Sharing on night lights emissions. The common trends
assumption establishes the counterfactual scenario from which we can draw our causal
inference: without the treatment—i.e. the representation of a grid cell’s ethnic groups
in the power-sharing government—the trend in night lights emissions would have been
similar across treated and untreated grid cells. The treatment induces a deviation from
this common trend, approximating the causal effect of the treatment.8
However, this common trends assumption is conditional on other time-varying vari-
ables. It is plausible that, for instance, population changes over time or differential ending
of battle violence can distort grid cell specific trends. To adjust for this, we include a
vector of time-varying control variables X i t in Equation 1. These control variables include
measures of population size and violence.
Population size accounts for the possibility that people might move out of ethnic
settlement areas in response to violence or repopulate regions from which they previously
fled, which might then appear as correlation between rebel constituency areas and night
7Since autocorrelation is a potential problem in this setup, we report clustered standard errors on the
grid cell level. Moreover, we use a one year lead of (logged) night lights at t+1 as dependent variable to
avoid simultaneity bias.
8We explore the common trends assumption graphically in the appendix and find that night light trends
prior to the establishment of the power-sharing government are likely to be conditional on covariates.
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light emissions. Our population measure is taken from the gridded population of the
world data set as included in the PRIO GRID data (CIESIN 2005).9 Regions which have
experienced higher levels of civil war violence might be more likely to receive a peace
dividend as humanitarian aid flows increase, infrastructure is rebuilt, and refugees return
to their homes. Rebel elites, for instance, might have to reward those communities which
suffered most for their support during the conflict. Such cells might therefore experience
increases in night-time light intensity. Consequently, we control for the cumulative sums
of Past Battle Fatalities and Past Non-State Fatalities (Sundberg and Melander 2013).10
Results
We report results of estimating Equation 1 in Table 2. The first model of Table 2 represents
a baseline model with only grid cell fixed effects. The second column adds a full set of
country-year dummies to account for country- and time-specific annual shocks. Model 3
adds the time-varying covariates. Model 4 additionally controls for a lagged dependent
variable to account for reverse causality and additional dynamics in regional investment
patterns.11 Models 5 and 6 explore our main results using different comparison groups.
Across all models in Table 2, the coefficient for Representation in Executive Power-
Sharing is positive and statistically significant, even though the coefficient becomes
smaller as country-year fixed effects are added. Overall, the results are consistent with
our theoretical expectations. As an ethnic group in a grid cell becomes represented in the
power-sharing government, the grid cell’s night light emissions increase as well.
Models 1-4 establish this increase in comparison to all other ethnic groups in a
9The data is available in 5-years intervals, starting from 1990. We linearly interpolate the intermediate
years.
10Ideally, we would also control directly for the presence of peacekeepers as a proxy for sub-national
international engagement. However, spatially disaggregated data on peacekeeping only exists for a limited
number of cases and time periods which do not completely overlap with our geographical and temporal
scope (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2018).
11We exclude a lagged dependent variable from the rest of our models since it can induce Nickell (1981)
bias.
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post-conflict country. This approach helps us to identify a baseline average effect and
we therefore use it for subsequent mechanism, placebo and robustness tests. It masks,
however, if the effect differs when the control is comprised either of only groups that
remain excluded even once the power-sharing government is established (Model 5), or of
only non-rebel constituency groups that were already included in the governing coalition
before and during the power-sharing government (Model 6).
Making this control group distinction explicit allows us to test if our results are simply
driven by control groups trends. Our positive coefficient for power-sharing representation
might reflect the fact that the establishment of a power-sharing government makes
already excluded groups worse off. However, the results of Model 5 in Table 2 reject this
alternative explanation. The coefficient for power-sharing representation is smaller in
Model 5 than in Models 1-4, but still positive and statistically different from zero. This
implies that excluded groups also benefit from the end of the conflict—but to a lesser
extent than groups included in the power-sharing government whose elites can access
and redistribute resources from the center.
We can also use the control group distinction to test whether rebel representation in
power-sharing makes not only newly represented areas better off, but also if it makes al-
ready included groups in the governing coalition worse off. This would provide additional
evidence for the economic component of our power-sharing theory. If power-sharing
is indeed about rebels redirecting funds from a common, zero-sum “government pie,”
this redistribution should come at the cost of already included groups. The coefficient
of Model 6 provides additional evidence for this argument. It is positive, statistically
significant, and larger than the coefficient of Models 1-5. This implies both that formerly
excluded ethnic groups benefit from power-sharing through rebel elites, while already
included groups simultaneously become worse off.
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Substantive Effects
The exotic nature of our dependent variable makes it difficult to get a sense of the effect
size from the raw coefficients.12 To estimate the substantive effect size of our findings,
we exploit the fact that night lights can be used to predict local wealth (Weidmann
and Schutte 2017). We follow existing research and express the effects of executive
power-sharing on night light emissions as percent of local GDP (Henderson, Storeygard,
and Weil 2012; Hodler and Raschky 2014).13 We find that the effect of Representation
in Executive Power-Sharing—as estimated in Model 3—corresponds to an increase in
gross-cell product by about 0.91%. This means that grid cells with an ethnic group
represented by rebels in a power-sharing government have on average a regional GDP
that is about 1% higher than the regional GDP of other grid cells based on their night
light increase.
While this effect size might seem small at first, we believe it is reasonable for two
reasons. First, it is to be expected theoretically. Night light emissions proxy a variety
of resources, such as infrastructure and electricity, but they are not the only possible
resources elites in power-sharing governments can allocate (Kramon and Posner 2013).
Even if there is a strong net redistributive effect of power-sharing, our data can only
capture the effect reflected in night lights. This makes night lights increases a conservative
estimate of the net redistributive effect and thus likely to be small overall. Second, our
finding is of a similar magnitude as other findings on the effects of distributive politics on
night light emissions. Hodler and Raschky (2014, 1013) report that those sub-national
regions from which a country’s political leader originates experience an increase in local
GDP by about 1.3%.
12Moreover, and similar to other existing studies of night lights as economic development, see e.g.
Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012), a large part of the explained variation in our dependent variable
stems from the grid cell and country-year fixed effects: model diagnostics indicate that about 47% of the
R2 are attributed to differences between grid cells and another approximately 40% are attributable to over
time variation. However, R2 is neither a good indicator of model fit nor of the explanatory power of our
main independent variable (King 1986, 675ff). We therefore complement our analysis with out-of-sample
predictions below.
13We describe the calculation in the online appendix.
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To compare this effect size to other variables and to account for the potentially
misleading predictive accuracy of the R2 in our models, we perform an out-of-sample
prediction exercise using 10-fold cross-validation. To assess the relative importance of
our power-sharing dummy, we include common correlates of night light emissions into
this predictive model (Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2012; Weidmann and Schutte
2017).14 In contrast to the explanatory approach employed so far, the goal of this exercise
is not to isolate the effect of representation in power-sharing from potential confounders.
Rather, it answers the following questions: How useful is it to know that a grid cell is
represented in the power-sharing government to predict the levels of night light emissions?
How useful is this knowledge compared to other predictors of night lights?
To answer these questions, Figure 4 plots the importance of each variable in predicting
night lights from grid cell level information. The lagged dependent variable as well as
population come out as the most important predictors. This is not surprising. Economic
development is sluggish, suggesting strong autocorrelation, while population levels have
been found to be one of the strongest predictor of night light emissions in general
(Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 2012). Nevertheless, the power-sharing dummy
emerges as the third most important variable in the cross-validation model. This means
that to predict night lights from grid cell level information, it is more useful to know that
a cell was ethnically represented by rebels in the power-sharing executive than to know
the cell’s urbanization level, its petroleum deposits, or the cell’s distance to the capital.
We interpret this as additional evidence that the effect of power-sharing, while small, is
still substantively important.
Type and Duration of Power-Sharing Governments
The difference-in-differences strategy guards against a wide range of potential con-
founders of the relationship between power-sharing and night lights. Since we cannot
find a source of strictly exogenous variation for power-sharing, however, concerns remain
14We discuss the details of this cross-validation exercise in the online appendix.
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Figure 4. Predictive Performance from Cross Validation Models
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Note: Variable importance scores based on t-statistics from a 10-fold cross-validation linear regression
model with 15 test/training splits.
about unobserved variables that might bias this relationship. We therefore complement
our main analysis with evidence for additional implications of the theory (Rosenbaum
2002, 5f).
In a first step, we investigate if night lights vary with the type of power-sharing in
theoretically expected ways. Our argument emphasizes the effects of elite access to state
funds through participation in post-conflict cabinets. Rebel elites might be better able to
channel funds towards their political supporters if they possess sufficient political power
to do so. We should therefore observe a stronger pattern if we examine night lights in
constituency regions when rebel elites hold more powerful positions. We therefore add
Representation in Executive Power-Sharing (Senior Portfolios) to Equation 1. It measures
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whether a grid cell is inhabited by ethnic groups who have a link to a rebel group that
occupies politically powerful cabinet portfolios.15
In addition to political power, resource allocation to supporters might be a function
of rebel elites explicitly controlling economic resources. A second dummy variable—
Representation in Executive Power-Sharing (Economic Portfolios)—consequently captures
whether an ethnic group has links to rebels occupying portfolios managing the post-conflict
country’s economy, its resources or infrastructure.16
Finally, we also test how the nature of the link between rebel elites and their con-
stituencies affects night light intensity. We would expect that constituencies closer to the
rebel leadership receive more resources as they are more reliable providers of political
support. Data on rebel leaders’ ethnic affiliations therefore informs the dummy variable
Representation in Executive Power-Sharing (Leadership Constituency) (Ottmann 2012). It
considers only those grid cells inhabited by ethnic groups represented in power-sharing
governments when the rebel leader stems from the same ethnic group.
In Figure 5 we report the results of these additional regressions. The plot shows
coefficient estimates—based on equivalents of Model 3 in Table 2—for each variable with
varying leads of the dependent variable. Across specifications, the results are consistent
with our expectations. We find the strongest effect for those grid cells with ethnic groups
that belong to the same ethnicity as the rebel leader. With coefficients between 0.011 and
0.06 the effect is almost twice as large as in our main models, providing further evidence
for a redistributive effect of power-sharing governments.
The temporary nature of power-sharing and night lights as slow-moving resource
investments allows us to test another theoretical implication. Power-sharing governments
are typically interim institutions, often with explicit sunset clauses, established as part of
a peace deal until more long-term steps towards peace can be taken.17 This temporary
15We define the following cabinet portfolios as politically powerful: vice president, prime minister,
foreign affairs, justice, defense, interior and finance.
16Please consult the online appendix for a detailed overview of cabinet portfolios held by rebel elites
and their classification into these categories.
17In some cases, power-sharing cabinets where some groups receive specific ethnic quotas become
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Figure 5. Minister Portfolios, Constituency Type and Night Light Emissions over Time
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nature of the institution implies that access to state resources ends if rebels do not
manage to remain in power. As funding for infrastructure dries out and maintenance
becomes more difficult, we expect the effect of regional representation in power-sharing
to dissipate over time. At the same time, night light investments require some time to
take effect. Thus, any effect is likely to be more pronounced only after some time after
the implementation of the power-sharing government.
Figure 5 also allows us to test both propositions. In addition to the different types
of power-sharing, it displays the coefficient when we measure the dependent variable
at different points in the future. Consistent with our expectations, we observe that the
effect is only small in the first year, becomes largest in the second year, and dissipates
slowly over time.18
part of a permanent solution, enshrined in the constitution. In the countries we study, all power-sharing
governments ended within three years. The exception is Sudan where the power-sharing government in
Khartoum ended with the independence of South Sudan in 2011.
18In the appendix, we test the idea of night light variation with the end of power-sharing more formally.
The results are consistent with our expectation: once power-sharing ends, coefficients that capture night
light emissions in constituency regions drop in size and become statistically insignificant.
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Constituency Characteristics
While the previous tests have attempted to establish the fact that post-conflict night
light improvements are indeed attributable to rebel participation in government, it is
still difficult to assess whether this result is indeed driven by redistribution. To generate
implications that allow us to test this redistributive mechanism more directly, we turn
to the literature on public goods provisions in ethnically heterogeneous societies. This
literature has established that public goods provision in ethnically diverse locations tends
to be lower (Ejdemyr, Kramon, and Robinson 2018; Tajima, Samphantharak, and Ostwald
2018). It is difficult for elites, the argument goes, to identify who will profit from resource
allocation if both constituency and non-constituency groups occupy the same area.
We would expect this pattern to be even more pronounced in post-conflict settings:
in contexts with a history of extreme inter-group ethnic violence, it is unlikely that elites
will direct resources to areas where these goods could end up benefiting groups that were
involved in violence against their own group. We should therefore observe night light
emissions to be particularly high in areas where elites can clearly identify constituencies,
for instance, in grid cells where only one or very few groups settle simultaneously.
Figure 6 displays the marginal of effect of power-sharing on night light emissions,
based on an interaction between our power-sharing dummy variable and the number of
ethnic groups in a grid cell. The pattern suggests that the effect of a grid cell’s power-
sharing representation is most visible when the number of groups in a cell is low. The
effect notably declines and becomes negative—albeit statistically insignificant—as the
number of groups in a cell increases. This provides reassuring evidence that indeed a
political redistribution effect is at work in which elites target resources based on the
observable number of groups in the recipient location.
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Figure 6. Night Light Emissions in Constituency Areas with Varying Numbers of Ethnic
Groups
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Note: Marginal effect of Representation in Executive Power-Sharing at varying numbers of ethnic groups per
grid cell. Models include grid cell and country-year fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals shown.
Robustness Tests
In the appendix we present a number of additional robustness tests. First, we replicate
our analysis with different geographical units to account for the possibility of a modifiable
area unit problem. We also account for spatial dependency through spatially robust
standard errors. Second, we replicate our main model using only geographically matched
grid cells just inside or outside an ethnic group’s settlement area in order to account
for unobserved heterogeneity across observations. Third, we explore whether the effect
of power-sharing dissipates over time and whether it represents a reversion to ex-ante
economic activity. Finally, we conduct a placebo test to ascertain whether the reported
effects are indeed attributable to the representation in executive power-sharing and not
to peace agreements more broadly. Across all models, our substantive results hold.
30
Conclusion
In this article, we examine the relationship between post-conflict power-sharing, state
revenues and resource redistribution in Africa. We put forward the idea that power-
sharing governments represent a unique opportunity for rebel elites to generate revenue
from state resources. Modeling rebel elites as rent- and office-seeking agents implies
that power-sharing governments should preferentially redistribute resources to those
sub-national regions which harbor ethnic constituents of the rebels in the power-sharing
government in the political center. We argue that such preferential resource allocation is
observable as an increase in electrification, detectable through the emission of electricity-
powered light during night time.
Across a wide range of statistical models, we are able to show that those grid cells
whose ethnic groups become represented by a rebel group in a power-sharing government
exhibit higher night light emissions than those grid cells without this representation.
We interpret this pattern as an empirical expression of the fact that executive-level
power-sharing in Africa has a genuine territorial and economic dimension.
Our study’s empirical focus is on African post-conflict countries and we are careful not
to generalize beyond this continent. Future work should therefore investigate more closely
the relationship between power-sharing and resource redistribution in other parts of the
world. Empirically, such work would benefit from more refined measures of redistribution.
While our night light measure can capture a wide range of political goods, such as
infrastructure investments that are reflected in increased electrification, it is oblivious
to other patronage resources, such as jobs or preferential access to post-conflict aid that
is not directly reflected in economic development (e.g. schooling, health). Another
limitation of this study is its somewhat imprecise measurement of ethnic settlement
areas, especially in ethnically heterogeneous areas. Future research should invest in
individual-level survey data on ethnicity, rebel affiliation, and redistribution to shed light
on the precise micro-level mechanisms underlying the results documented in this paper.
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This notwithstanding, our political economy approach injects new life into the estab-
lished research program on the effects of power-sharing on post-conflict peace. Prior
research has emphasized the allocation of decision-making rights or distribution of spoils
among elites in power-sharing arrangements. In an attempt to integrate these approaches
with research on distributive politics, we shift the perspective towards redistribution
among former rebel elites and their constituencies. Whether or not successful redistri-
bution changes both objective and perceived group grievances—and thus reduces the
probability of renewed conflict—remains an exciting avenue for future studies.
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